
The new message is that it is every country for itself, and this changes the use and meaning of stress tests by the banks. What looked like a climatic disaster for the global economy is now turning into a battle between countries. Germany defeated Greece and the PIIGS in the Euro Area, but the Euro Area is now at economic banking war with the Anglo-Saxons, USA and UK, within the EU and transatlantic. At stake may be the coming recession for the Euro Area and how deep and prolonged this will be. But, I know that there will not be a comparable or even roughly precisely similar modeling of the stress test scenarios by all banks; they will each be as different as the pictures shown here of the battle of Trafalgar, partial, subjective, and incomplete.

These are the analyses of banks in each national sector that we experts will be examining. The Euro Area does not seem to have recognised and decided openly that sharing a common currency means they are mutually dependent. There remain strong political voices advocating the break-up of the Euro Area, letting some sink so that others can survive. Sensible people know that way lies defeat for all. Euro Area divided will lose and set back for another generation Europe's dream of action as a counterweight of equal strength in the world to the Anglo-Saxon economies who do operate as a group even though not formally so. Greece, Spain and Ireland thought Euro membership protected them; it hasn't. Germany and other export-led economies, including far-flung China, think they are protected by their trade surpluses, and have yet to discover fully that is not so either!

Arguably, the Credit Crunch was worse than it would have been if only the major banks in Europe had focused earlier on Pillar II and completed Pillar II before the crisis; none of them did so! They had been advised strongly by audit firms (insofar as they said clearly banks must begin by building up their historical data including data covering at least one earlier recession) and consultancies like myself to start with Pillar II back in 2005 and not to wait until Pillar I implementations were complete; none did so!
It is debatable if the regulators communicated the same signals. I don't think they did even though intelligent regulators knew long ago that Pillar I of Basel II was really only a temporary learning process and that Pillar II is the entire battleground of risk regulations. They knew this at least by 2007 when it was obvious banks were dragging their anchor chains on Pillar II work, if not earlier, including about the inter working required with IFRS accounting standards that also reflect the scenario modeling requirements of Pillar II stress tests etc.

It is not merely the supervisory pillar as the audit firms wrongly advised by simplifying or summarising the meaning of Pillar II. Pillar II requires firms to combine all their risk exposures into a set of macro models with scenarios based on cyclical changes in the underlying economies. Essentially it is all about getting banks to understand how their performance depends on the macro-economy. Unfortunately this was not a message they either understood or wanted to hear. Bankers are deeply suspicious of power grabs in the boardroom by economists 9who would then displace mere accountants and mathematicians) despite the latter showing no signs whatsoever of being hungry for such responsibility. Economists were not involved by banks in their efforts to build econometric models for scenario stress testing. The regulators required them to forecast using current risk accounting data in the context of a range of severe economic downturn factors. Bankers assumed this could be done by simply tweaking their risk accounts and the result universally was amateur hour quality. You can see it in the results and also in the recipe provided of headline numbers the banks were tasked to work with, not unlike battles led by generals who had never seen a war, didn't know what a whole fleet or army even looks and behaves like. Banking had not only become too complex for traditional regulations but also too complex for management, for new management that unlike traditional predecessors had less than a comprehensive understanding of basic banking.


With the Credit Crunch and resulting recession suddenly stress tests were no longer about speculating about an indeterminate time in the future, but about what is happening all around and in the banks yesterday, today and tomorrow, modeling the war while fighting it. But clarity was now precious and just as hard in the fog of war. This changed the character of stress tests as defined in the regulations to a real world modeling exercise with real data and lots more of it to be urgently computed than any theoretical abstract ideas hitherto had offered banks to work with. Banks, however, found themselves more lost than ever about where they were and to start and how to do such sophisticated intellectually demanding and at the same time dangerous work. While before capital reserve ratios were at risk now the banks saw stress tests as threatening to their independence and solvency! To make matters worse the banks were now being told in no uncertain terms by governments, using a force majeure that the central banks and regulators had not dreamed before the crisis they could muster, to do stress tests pronto beginning with the top banks in the USA and where the stress tests in the Spring of 2009 were not about years hence but about their economic capital over the next 6 months!

Europe followed suit for its top banks and decided to keep the results secret. The reason for all this secrecy was less to do with corporate confidentiality or fear of the Jacobin mob and more to do with fear of real economists calling the whole exercise amateur, lies or even a sick joke. Economists weren't that interested, however; banking has always been somewhat beneath them. Traditionally finance was considered by economists to be immaterial to how economies behave - they have been learning a new hard lesson about that, but the lessons haven't yet sunk in and I suppose many economists are reluctant to acknowledge what they dangerously overlooked for so long. Sensible academics know better than to get involved in institutional mess of others just as the best bankers knew to steer clear of risk because there are no bonuses in risk management.

In Europe, because of the sovereign debt crisis that has shifted the targets of capital markets short term speculators from attacking individuals banks to attacking all of national banking sectors, governments are fearful about the stress tests too and anxious that they should put their own banks in a competitively (defensive) good light. Even the very intelligent and feisty Christine Lagarde is anxious to use the tests as a good PR. That is of course the exact opposite of what the stress tests are for; they are for measuring worst-case not for showing relative better case.
In the case of France there is considerable suspicion that french banks have got away (with only a few exceptions) almost scot-free in their balance sheets, which look as though there had been almost no credit crunch or recession. German banks have not been so lucky and have had to evidence more financial embarassment than french banks. Belgian and Dutch banks were holed sunk (Fortis, ASBN-AMRO and Dexia) while ING and Rabobank were only holed above the waterline and continue to sail merely minus a few of their mainsails.

There is a French phrase "un coup de Trafalgar" which one might be forgiven for thinking it relates to be defeated. The phrase is certainly in the minds of the French, but "Non, pas de tout!" Un coup de Trafalgar translates as “an underhand trick.” You’ve got to love and admire the French who can turn defeat into a sneer, and there is something of this in how all countries and banks are actually managing their stress tests on a national banking sector basis as an arena for trickery to show things are better than expects, understandable perhaps in the presence of a submarine wolf pack of hedge fund capital market speculators who are hoping to profit from break-up and defeat of the Euro system, a defensive line of ships that are being broken apart just like at Trafalgar.

The stress tests are expected to include approximately 100 of the largest banks in the Euro Area plus regional and local banks that are government owned. nationalised banks strictly do not have to comply with Basel II risk regulations but governments are concerned about how much their guarantees may be called upon and the embarassment this could means for budget deficits and national debts, given the parsimony of the ECB and the limits of the new €720bn stabilisation fund in the exclusive hands of the European Commission whose banking and accounting skills are not legendary. €720bn is five times one year's annual Commission budget. Has it got the what it takes to manage this responsibly or technically - non, pas dout!

According to people involved in the European testing process, the initial exercise of testing the biggest banks in each country – 26 institutions had been done and is on schedule for publication on July 15. July 14 would have been a more resonant date. In my view if the tests and results are available by then, then the process has been far too rushed and the chances of credible results even less probably, certainly no time for boards to approve them and no time for any interative reworking to improve on the initial fag packet models.
CEBS questionnaires will have to be sent out via national banking regulators to about 125 institutions. The big question is whether the process will work in its aim to restore battered confidence in European banks. To repeat myself, if this is the aim it is wrongheaded according to the regulatory laws and the experts know that. European banks are worth 10 per cent less on average than two months ago, according to the FTSE Eurofirst 300 banks index. Enlarging the test should mean it takes to the end of July. I'd have specified end of September, but who wants to be worrying about all this while on their August holiday breaks.
Spain in particular is desperate to restore confidence in its banks quickly. Spain, which has tested all its banks according to CEBS guidelines is desperate to publish the results, has been instrumental in strong-arming other countries into extending the remit of the test, according to several people involved in the process. But, since this has become a competitive sovereign debt battle all have to publish, to fire their guns, at the same time. Germany was persuaded that to limit its test to only its three biggest banks was self-defeating, implicitly damning other untested institutions, notably the state-owned Landesbanken. The FT and others have commented that it is far from clear that the parameters of the tests will be tough enough to restore confidence across Europe. The same was said in 2009, and actually the CEBS tests are broadly a repeat of the exercise carried out in 2009, the quality of which I know to have been work that I would not pass if brought to me by first year undergraduates in either economic or business management school.
The banks to be stress-tested are:







“Given the difficulties, the preferable solution would be for each bank to disclose exposures so investors can base decisions on the facts, rather than questioning an imperfect test,” said Huw van Steenis to the FT, an analyst at Morgan Stanley. However, one senior official told the FT that the alternative idea of disclosing each bank’s sovereign holdings would be implemented as well. Combined with the running of simultaneous testing on a “top-down” basis by European authorities of the systemic macro-economic solidity of various banking sector exposures, such as commercial property, there is a growing belief that these stress tests could reassure the market sufficiently, as planned, is the FT's conclusion, adding that some analysts have suggested that panic about European banks’ exposure to sovereign debt could be overheated. All experts, including myself, agtree it is appallingly overheated and overheated by politicians as much as by speculators and runour-mongers and bloggers, but that the tests results will be reassuring I and other very much doubt, because the quality is easily comparable to the reassurances banks issued in 2008 saying they have no funding problems. The actual fact is that banbks do not know what their funding problems actually are because the uinterbank funding markets ahave been relatively closed in recent months and these tests are part of the battle, treated as a weapon not merely the half-time scorecard.

The credibility of CEBS’s latest tests will hinge on whether enough weaker banks fail, said one senior central banker in London this week, reported by the FT. “The tests need to be published, the parameters need to be fully transparent, and some banks need to fail.” That is in my opinion silly and irresponsible because as anyone must know the authorities will intervene before absolute failure, and in any case we don't have perfect agreed measures for what counts as failure.
There are more competing theories for how to measure a banmk's insolvency than there are stress test factors and scenarios. Several industry groups, such as the British Banking Association, have come out against bank-by-bank disclosure, saying that league-table-like results could trigger a panic run on an otherwise healthy institutions. However, many bank chief executives and chief financial officers concede that full disclosure might be the only way to address investors’ concerns, according to the FT.
What all seem to miss is that this is in the sopvereign debt context now and therefore the stress tests are of national banking sectors, not about individual banks. This is macro-prudential systemic risk stuff not microprudential. Anyone liuving in the let some fail so others can survive better totally misunderstands the interdependencies of banks and of banks and economies. Christine Lagarde understands that. What the tests will again prove is that bankers don't understand the economics of banking, least of all investment bankers, no true perspective or realistic sense of proportion. Unfortunately our economies are in the hands of banmks as much as the banks are in the hands of the economies where they do business but neither lendfers nor customer want to acknowledge their vulnerability to the other. Governments and central banks understand what matters most in this crisis but they are being attacked and weakened by the buccaneers and privateers of the capital markets!
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Stress test exercises divide EU regulators
Posted by Paul Murphy on Jul 07 21:46.
European regulators were locked in heated talks until late Wednesday as they sought to reach agreement on a politically sensitive exercise to stress test the continent’s banks, the FT reports. Although the Committee on European Banking Supervision (CEBS), the umbrella body for Europe’s regulators, had been due to publish details of the parameters of the closely watched stress testing exercise early on Wednesday, the process was delayed by disagreements over how much disclosure there should be about the severity of the stress scenarios, particularly relating to the banks’ sovereign debt holdings.
CEBS reveals stress test details (at last)
Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Jul 07 19:31.
It’s finally out!
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors has finally released (as promised) the details of Europe’s banking stress tests.
Here’s the statement, which also includes a list of all the banks to be tested:
KEY FEATURES OF THE EXTENDED EU-WIDE STRESS TEST
Following its statement issued on 18 June 2010, CEBS provides further information on the EU-wide stress test exercise which is now being finalised by CEBS and the national supervisory authorities, in close cooperation with the ECB.
The objective of the extended stress test exercise is to assess the overall resilience of the EU banking sector and the banks’ ability to absorb further possible shocks on credit and market risks, including sovereign risks, and to assess the current dependence on public support measures.
The exercise is being conducted on a bank-by-bank basis using commonly agreed macro-economic scenarios (baseline and adverse) for 2010 and 2011, developed in close cooperation with the ECB and the European Commission.
The macro-economic scenarios include a set of key macro-economic variables (e.g. the evolution of GDP, of unemployment and of the consumer price index), differentiated for EU Member States, the rest of the EEA countries and the US.
The exercise also envisages adverse conditions in financial markets and a shock on interest rates to capture an increase in risk premia linked to a deterioration in the EU government bond markets.
On aggregate, the adverse scenario assumes a 3 percentage point deviation of GDP for the EU compared to the European Commission’s forecasts over the two-year time horizon.
The sovereign risk shock in the EU represents a deterioration of market conditions as compared to the situation observed in early May 2010.
The scope of the stress testing exercise has been extended to include not only the major EU cross-border banking groups but also key domestic credit institutions in Europe.
The banks that have been included in the exercise are listed in the Annex.
In each EU Member State, the sample has been built by including banks, in descending order of size, so as to cover at least 50% of the national banking sector, as expressed in terms of total assets.
For the EU banking sector as a whole, the 91 banks represent 65% of the EU banking sector.
Banking groups have been tested on a consolidated level. This means that subsidiaries and branches of an EU cross-border banking group have been included in the exercise as a part of the test of the group as a whole.
The results of the stress test will be disclosed, both on an aggregated and on a bank-by-bank basis, on 23 July 2010. It should be noted that a stress testing exercise does not provide forecasts of expected outcomes, but rather a what-if analysis aimed at supporting the supervisory assessment of the adequacy of capital of European banks.
11 July
Dealogic notes €18.4bn bank bonds sold last week, and €4.8bn week before, by Barclays, BNP Paribas, HSBC, UBS & others. There’s an overhang of issuance due this year and therefore banks are competing to get in ahead of the queue.
The eurozone sovereign debt crisis shut the market for new borrowing for two months (according to Bank of England). It is only open to the best-regarded names. Many banks have not dared try to access the market at this time.
May and June are typically big bond issuance months ahead of summer slowdown. Banks aim to contract two-thirds of planned issuance by end of June. August and December are dead months and otherwise only Sept. Oct. & Nov. are busy.
Market sentiment turned after Spain got €14bn offers for €6bn 10-year bonds. 5 and 10-year bonds are considered long term by banks, expecting net interest profit in difference between short-term borrowing and long-term loans and vice versa. Regulators are pushing banks to use more long-term funding, but thi may not translate into longer term customer lending.
Rabobank issued €1bn 15-year, HSBC €1.5bn 10-year, Barclays €1.5bn and Intesa Sanpaolo €1.25bn of subordinated bonds that can count in regulatory capital. But these are small amounts in banks' rolling refillable MTN programmes e.g. RBS has 3: $50bn; £50bn and €50bn.BNP Paribas, UBS and RBS sold €1bn, €1.75bn and €1.25bn 5-year bonds.
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